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 ABSTRACT 
 
Trends and determinants of marriage payments have rarely been examined at the population 
level, despite their plausible implications for the welfare of family and the distribution of wealth 
across families and generations.  In this study, we analyze population-based data from the 
Vietnam Study of Family Change to examine prevalence, directions, and magnitude of marriage 
payments in Vietnam from 1963 to 2000. We investigate the extent to which structural and 
policy transformations (particularly the socialist policy that banned brideprice and subsequent 
market reform) influenced the practice of marriage payments as well as estimate how these 
societal changes indirectly impacted payments via their effects on population characteristics.  
Results indicate nuanced patterns of marriage payments during pre-socialist years. The socialist 
attempts to eradicate brideprice had moderate impacts in the North but were unsuccessful in the 
South. Marriage payments returned with vengeance following market reform. Results suggest 
that structural and policy change explained most of the observed variations in marriage payments 
and that individual characteristics mattered relatively little. The reemergence of marriage 
payments likely attests the persistence of traditional values and cultural resilience of marriage 
payments in the Vietnamese society.   
 
 
 
Prepared for a presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America 
(Session 3: Marriage Change in Developing Countries), Washington, DC, March 31, 2011. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Marriages are closely tied to the distribution of property within and between families. 
Exchanges between families at the time of marriage existed in most societies – at least at certain 
points in their history (Murdock, 1967; Goody and Tambiah, 1973).  Brideprice commonly refers 
to the property transferred from the groom’s family to the bride’s, whereas dowry generally 
refers to monetary or material gifts transferred from the bride’s side to the groom’s.  Evidence 
suggests that trends in marriage payments can be multifaceted and complex and that prevalence, 
direction, magnitude, and property rights tend to vary considerably over time and across societies 
(Anderson, 2007).  While marriage payments have tended to decline and eventually to disappear 
in modern societies, it is not uncommon to observe practice of payments waning only to re-
emerge later.  In some circumstances, the magnitude of payments might have remained constant 
and then escalate sharply.  In other cases, the direction might have switched from the groom’s 
family to the brides’ and property rights over the payments may have shifted between the 
newlyweds and parental generations.  Until recently, existing research on marriage payments has 
been drawn primarily from anthropological and historical accounts. Rarely have trends and 
determinants been examined empirically at the population level, even though payments can be 
substantial and have significant implications for the welfare of wives and the distribution of 
wealth across families and generations.  
 
Our study extends prior research by examining trends and determinants of marriage 
payments in Vietnam from 1963 to 2000 based on survey data from the Vietnam Study of Family 
Change.  The innovative design of the study permits a systematic evaluation of population-level 
prevalence, directions, and magnitude of marriage payments among successive marriage cohorts. 
Moreover, Vietnam provides a unique setting that can advance our understanding about 
mechanisms underlying changing trends in the payments.  During the 20th century, Vietnam 
underwent major social upheavals including decades of continuous wars, as well as structural 
transformations including periods of socialist collectivization, severe economic stagnation, and 
rapid economic growth following market liberalization policies. Yet, northern and southern 
Vietnam differed quite remarkably in their cultural orientation and political, social, and 
economic trajectories (Rambo, 1973; Keyes, 1995).  Arguably, the North has historically been 
more oriented than the South towards the East Asian model of patriarchal kinship and family 
structure, whereas the bilateral kinship system common in Southeast Asia are practiced more 
widely among the southern populations than among their northern counterparts.  Recent 
structural changes in Vietnam, including two decades (1954-1975) of separation under different 
governments, further underlie the regional differences.  Beginning in the early 1950s, the North 
was exposed to socialist policies which not only promoted gender equality in educational 
opportunities and labor force participation but also prohibited Confucian-based family practices 
such as arranged marriage and brideprice payments.  The government viewed the institution of 
marriage and family as key to the reproduction of social inequality and sought to devalue 
interfamilial marital transfers as an essential step towards the elimination of private ownership 
and social inequality.  Contrary to the North, the South was ruled by a pro-U.S. government 
whose philosophy and policies were diametrically opposite to those of revolutionary socialism. 
Only after the country’s reunification in 1975 did the South experience the socialist 
transformation.  Past research indicates that these regional differences had implications for 
marriage and family behaviors such as wedding practices (Goodkind, 1996), elderly living 
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arrangements (Knodel et al., 2000), and gender division of household labor (Teerawichitchainan 
et al., 2010).  
 
To examine the roles of societal structure, economic conditions, policy changes, and 
cultural influences on interfamilial marital transfers, we compare regional and cohort patterns in 
prevalence of marriage payments among marriages that were contracted during Vietnam’s three 
recent historical periods: 1) the Vietnam War; 2) nationwide socialist collectivization and 
widespread economic recession; and 3) market reform and economic revitalization.  Moreover, 
we describe changes over the last four decades in the directions of marriage payments.  Since 
ethnographic evidence suggests that Vietnam, along with China and Taiwan, is one of the few 
populations in the world that observe payments commonly originating from both the bride’s and 
the groom’s sides (Malarney, 2002), we are particularly interested in measuring the prevalence 
and determinants of bidirectional transfers.  Further, in lieu of addressing the monetary 
magnitude of the payments, we describe patterns of gifts exchanged between families and how 
they have altered across cohorts and regions.  Given that Vietnam’s structural and policy 
transformations have left profound imprints on the position of women and men in the society, 
gender role ideology, and parent-child relationships (Pettus, 2003; Barbieri and Belanger, 2009), 
we examine the extent to which changes in bride’s and groom’s socioeconomic characteristics 
and manner of mate selection across successive cohorts affect the likelihood of marriage 
payments. Findings are interpreted with the aim to understand the changing nature, meanings, 
and functions of marriage payments as well as to shed more light on the complex patterns of 
intergenerational and interfamilial distribution of wealth at the time of marriage in the context of 
rapid social change. 
 
 
MARRIAGE PAYMENTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
 
The custom of marriage payments dates back to the time of ancient civilizations. 
Brideprice usually exists in primitive, tribal, or nomadic societies where polygyny is not 
uncommon and women are particularly active in agricultural production (Boserup, 1970).  
Anthropologists point out that the size of brideprice is closely related to the number of rights 
transferred from the bride’s to the groom’s side, including the rights to her labor and 
reproductive capacity, and tends to be rather standardized across different strata of society, 
(Goody, 1973; Zhang, 2000).  Brideprice could be expressed in various forms in addition to 
money (Boomgaard 2003).  Further, brideprice can be transferred either to the bride’s parents or 
directly to the bride. The former can be observed in sub-Saharan Africa where it was often used 
to establish future marriages for the male siblings of the bride, while the latter can be found 
among traditional Islamic marriages where it functioned as the bride’s insurance in case of 
divorce or widowhood.  
 
Unlike brideprice, dowry payments are mainly found in societies that practice 
endogamous marriages and exhibit substantial social and economic differentiation (Murdock, 
1967; Harrell and Dicky, 1985).  Researchers argue that as societies become more stratified, the 
practice of brideprice begins to wane and gives way to the custom of dowry.  While brideprice 
and dowry transfers tend to be mutually exclusive (Becker, 1991), evidence from China, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam reveals that it is plausible for both systems to coexist.  Traditionally, dowry is 
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transferred from parents directly to daughters as a pre-mortem inheritance, as evidenced in a 
strong link between women’s rights to inherit property and a receipt of dowry in some pre-
industrial societies (Goody, 1973; Botticini and Siow, 2003).  However, as societies become 
more complex and commercialized, researchers argue that groom and his family tend to gain 
greater control of dowry. As a result, dowry may transform from a bride’s bequest to a direct 
transfer to groom.  In modern-day South Asia, where such change in property rights took place, 
dowry serves as a tool for bride’s family to maintain their social status by attracting a groom of 
equal or higher social position. The amount of dowry can vary significantly depending on wealth 
status of the bride’s family, the groom’s future prospects, and the couple’s education (Caldwell 
et al., 1983). The amount sometimes equates several times the household annual income (Rao 
1993). 
 
The reasons why prevalence, direction, magnitude, and property rights of marriage 
payments change over time have not yet been well understood.  Anthropologists argue that 
modernization is the key social force that has caused decline and disappearance of marriage 
payments in many societies (see Anderson, 2007 for review).  In Europe, for instance, the 
Industrial Revolution was believed to trigger the decline in dowry first among the urban 
populations and subsequently among their rural counterparts (Goody, 1973).  Similarly, 
researchers observed that brideprice began to wane in Africa during the 1960s, when urban 
couples shifted from customary to civil marriages and when wage-earning grooms, instead of 
extended clans, took financial responsibility for the payments. While insightful, these 
explanations are based on anecdotal evidence or convenience samples concentrating on one or 
two geographic areas and should thus be considered tentative. They have not yet addressed what 
specific mechanisms in the modernization process that brought about the decline and more 
importantly, why such mechanisms led to a decline in many societies but an increase in other 
parts of the world such as dowry inflation in South Asia.  
 
More recently, economists have attempted to offer economic explanations for the varied 
trends in marriage payments. Their explanations tend to center around functionality of the 
payments.  For example, Becker (1991) argues that dowry serves as a price to clear the marriage 
market. However, when there is a more efficient way for parents to provide for their daughters’ 
future wealth such as investing in their human capital (i.e., education), dowry may cease to 
function and eventually disappear.  Botticini and Siow (2003) further demonstrate that the 
decline in dowry payments is closely linked to the shift in development and diversification of 
labor market. As sons are increasingly less likely to live and work with parents and as return to 
human capital increases, it becomes less functional to use dowry as bequests to provide children 
work incentives.  Along the same line of argument, Anderson (2003) proposes that as society 
places greater emphasis on achieved over ascribed status, there is less demand for dowry as a 
means to attract endogamous matching.  Further, Rao (1993)’s approach attributes change in 
population composition as a major cause of change in marriage payments and has been used to 
explain both dowry inflation and brideprice decline. Dowry inflation in India is arguably a 
response to an excess supply of women (i.e., brides) over men in the respective marriageable 
ages, whereas the decline in brideprice in Africa is linked to a surplus of brides due to population 
growth and increasing marital age for grooms. The economic functionality explanations provide 
empirical evidence and advance the literature on marriage payments; yet, they remain puzzling 
and handicapped by a lack of baseline data that permits an evaluation of change over time 
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(Anderson 2007).  Further, these studies have not yet examined the extent bidirectional marriage 
transfers take place (except for Zhang and Chan, 1999) and the reasons brideprice payments 
increase in certain settings.  The roles of social policies and state intervention on eradicating 
brideprice have rarely been explored empirically outside the context of China (Ebrey, 1993; Siu, 
1993; Gates, 1997; Yan, 2003).  
 
 
THE VIETNAM CONTEXT 
 
Marriage payments in traditional Vietnam were often the result of long negotiations 
between the groom’s and the bride’s families.  Brideprice was typically compulsory and 
historically considered the most important transaction between the two families when a marriage 
took place (Malarney, 2002).  Meanwhile, dowry was more voluntary in nature1 and represented 
a smaller proportion of marriage transaction.  Brideprice was traditionally comprised of items 
such as betel leaves, areca nuts, live pigs, cooked pork, glutinous rice, tea, gold, money, and 
cloth (Toan, 1968, pp.340-343 cited in Malarney, 2002). In reality, the magnitude of brideprice 
depended largely on the economic means of the groom’s family. While the prescribed minimum 
brideprice was a tray of betel leaves and areca nuts (Hickey, 1964), a study in the Red River 
Delta suggests that the size of brideprice payments could impose significant financial burdens to 
the groom’s family (Gourou, 1955). 
 
Brideprice payments symbolically marked the groom’s deference to the bride’s family 
and were used to facilitate the wedding ceremony for the bride’s natal family and to provide for 
her dowry (Pham, 1999).  Managed by the bride’s parents and senior relatives, brideprice 
transfers such as areca nuts and tea accompanied invitations to the wedding banquet organized 
by the bride’s family2. Some food items were offered at the altar of the bride’s lineage hall and 
also presented to important kin, including the bride’s lineage chief and her paternal and maternal 
grandparents. On the wedding morning, the remaining food was served in a modest feast for 
close kin and family friends.  Other items from the brideprice such as gold, jewelry, and cloth 
were often used to replenish a bequest given to the bride upon her departure from the natal 
household. Since dowry was commonly financed with a return portion of the brideprice, it was 
sometimes referred to as indirect dowry (Goody, 1973). Vietnamese brides might use this 
indirect dowry as her independent fund or as an endowment for the new conjugal unit.  
 
In 1954, when the socialist government officially came into power in northern Vietnam, 
not only did it attempt to collectivize the whole economy and implement extensive land reforms, 
but the regime also tried to eradicate the so-called traditional family. The socialist government 
                                                 
1 In his ethnographic study in the Mekong River Delta in southern Vietnam during the late 1950s, Hickey (1964) did 
not mention the practice of dowry transfers in his study village but his description of brideprice custom had a great 
resemblance to the anthropological and historical accounts in the North (Hickey, 1964).  
 
2 On the wedding day, the families of brides and grooms, particularly those in the North, commonly held separate 
wedding banquets at their respective natal household.  The son preference was asserted by differentiating the size of 
the bride’s and groom’s feasts.  The groom’s banquet typically included a larger number of guests and was 
considered a public celebration, whereas the bride’s party was characterized as a modest family-centered 
celebration. 
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considered a swift modernization of marriage and family patterns as part of its grand strategy for 
industrial development, social equity, and political consolidation (Goodkind, 1996).  It argued 
that practices such as brideprice helped preserving a system of private property and inheritance 
and in turn, helped perpetuating social inequality. A close counterpart of China’s 1950 Marriage 
Law, northern Vietnam’s Marriage and Family Law was officially implemented in 1960 and 
aimed to eradicate arranged marriages, wife abuse, concubinage, polygamy, and economic 
exchanges at the time of marriage (Eisen, 1984).  The law specifically attacked brideprice 
payments but did not explicitly ban dowry transfers (Luong, 1993; Malarney, 2002). Village 
cadres often portrayed brideprice demand as an attempt to sell daughters to the highest bidder. In 
addition to banning brideprice, the law also encouraged parsimony in wedding practices and 
portrayed elaborate wedding banquets as wasteful and weakening the country’s economic 
productivity. 
  
Studies indicate that the socialist government’s attempts to reform the traditional 
marriage and family system gained moderate success in northern Vietnam during the 1960s and 
early 1970s. Among the law’s most salient outcome was the near eradication of parent-arranged 
marriages after 1960 (Nguyen, 1998; Pham, 1999). While the law could not completely get rid of 
marriage payments, evidence suggests that the payments became less common.  According to 
Goodkind (1996), a northern Vietnamese community observed a decline of gift exchanges at the 
time of marriage (either brideprice or dowry) from over 30 percent among couples married in the 
1950s to 10-20 percent among those married a decade later.  In addition to declining prevalence, 
the magnitude of brideprice was reportedly scaled down. Brideprice during this period tended to 
comprise of non-monetary items, such as cigarettes, tea, biscuits, rice, pork, betel leaves, and 
areca nuts, whereas dowry was largely restricted to personal clothing, pillows, or blankets 
(Kleinen, 1999). 
 
Following the reunification of North and South Vietnam in 1975, the socialist 
government attempted to implement in the South similar economic and social policies that had 
been quite successful in the North two decades earlier. However, the attempts to collectivize the 
southern economy and consolidate the newly-unified country failed –resulting in nationwide 
economic stagnation. The socialist agenda to reform marriage and family systems also faced 
significant challenges in the South. While evidence was rather scanty with regards to how the 
socialist policies affected marriage practices in this region during the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
there was a general impression that the South had a greater tendency than the North to adopt 
behaviors that were different from the ones prescribed by the government (Belanger, 2000). A 
retrospective survey in one South-Central community demonstrates that there was no apparent 
decline in interfamilial gift-giving among marriages contracted after the reunification (Goodkind, 
1996).  
 
In the late 1980s, Vietnam shifted from a centrally-planned to a market economy in 
response to deep economic recession and widespread poverty.  The economic policy, also known 
as doi moi (renovation), led to reduced government control over household production, rapid 
economic growth, and improved living standards in the following decades.  With the state’s loss 
of interest in promoting Marxist orthodoxy and less control over individual lives, several 
observers speculated that Confucian-based religious and social practices would be revived.  
Pioneering research suggests that during the period immediately after the reform, there was a 
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resurgence of traditional marriage practices that were once considered feudal (Luong, 1993; 
Goodkind, 1996; Kleinen, 1999; Malarney, 2002). As families gradually regained more control 
over household economy and family life, lavish wedding feasts became more prevalent. 
Malarney’s ethnographic study during the early 1990s reveals that while families still routinely 
recounted that demanding brideprice equated selling one’s daughter, in practice they willingly 
accepted brideprice which was then used as a dowry or as a fund for throwing the wedding 
banquet.  Marriage payments during this period tended to involve an increasing variety of gift 
items, including money, gold, clothing, mosquito nets, household items, and bicycles. Further, it 
also became customary for wedding guests to offer cash gifts to bride’s and groom’s families.   
 
Various social forces during the second half of the 20th century were likely to have direct 
and indirect influences on trends in marriage payments in Vietnam.  While the socialist 
government’s efforts to reform traditional family through enacting the 1960 Marriage and Family 
law appeared to have suppressed brideprice in certain communities in Vietnam as evidenced in 
past ethnographic research, its population-level impacts are unknown.  Further, the government’s 
determination to accelerate the modernization and industrialization process first through 
collectivization and subsequently through market measures may have impacted marriage 
payments through their effects on intra- and inter-familial relationships such as the extent to 
which family invests in children’s education, how children contribute to the household economy, 
the social position of daughters relative to son’s, and the degrees children could exert their 
independence from parents’ influences. To explore trends and mechanisms underlying changes 
in marriage payments, we analyze survey data representative of both northern and southern 
Vietnam and three marriage cohorts that were in turn exposed to wars, socialist policies, and 
market reform.  Trends and determinants of brideprice and dowry payments as well as those of 
bidirectional marital transfers are examined within bivariate and multivariate frameworks. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Our data come from two regional surveys conducted by the Hanoi-based Institute of 
Sociology that comprise the Vietnam Study of Family Change.  The first survey was carried out 
in March and April 2003 in seven provinces including Hanoi in the northern region of the Red 
River Delta.  Using an identical questionnaire, the second survey was conducted exactly one year 
later in 2004 in Ho Chi Minh City and six neighboring southern provinces covering substantial 
parts of the Mekong River Delta and the southeastern region.  Each regional survey was 
administered to 1,296 currently married individuals.  For convenience, we refer to the Red River 
Delta sample as the North and the sample of the Ho Chi Minh City and environs as the South.  
Because we relate behavior at the time of marriage to the present region of residence, some 
respondents and their spouses migrated between that time and the time of the survey and may 
even have lived outside the sample areas covered by the two surveys.  However, according to our 
diagnostic analysis3, such mismatch accounts for only a small proportion of the samples.  Almost 
                                                 
3 The surveys did not ask where respondents lived during their early married years. Place of birth, however, was 
asked and this information enables us to assess how serious the mismatch between current and early marriage 
residence might be. In the northern sample, 84 percent of respondents were born in their current province, 95 percent 
were born in one of the provinces covered by the survey (i.e., the Red River Delta) and 99 percent were born in the 
former North Vietnam.  In the southern sample, 60 percent of respondents were born in their current province, 70 
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every respondent and their spouse in the North sample were born in the former North Vietnam.  
Although results point to more migration in the southern sample, a majority of respondents who 
came from outside the survey area came from neighboring provinces in the Mekong River Delta 
and southeastern provinces near Ho Chi Minh City.  Nevertheless, it is important to recognize 
that the regional comparisons presented are potentially, even if only modestly, affected by post-
marital migration into the survey areas from outside.  
 
The sample was selected based on a multistage stratified cluster sampling approach4.  To 
understand marriage behavior over time, three marriage cohorts were targeted for interviews.  
For the wartime cohort, the range of marriage dates (1963-1971) ends a few years prior to North 
Vietnam’s victory in 1975, thus representing northern and southern respondents who experienced 
their early marital years during the time of military conflicts and in the case of the South, those 
who were exposed to the pre-socialist social structure and traditional family system.  Since 
Vietnam’s socialist policies were officially implemented in the North during the mid-1950s but 
the earliest marriage cohort in each regional sample was contracted in 1963, we are mindful 
about our limitation in assessing pre-socialist marriage behaviors among northerners.  Further, 
the middle cohort (1977-1985) represents new marriages during the post-reunification period 
when Vietnam underwent a pervasive centrally-planned economy and experienced severe 
economic stagnation.  The most recent cohort (1992-2000) was selected to capture marital 
experience during the period when the market reform that originated in 1986 became widely 
effective.  We refer to these three cohorts as the wartime, the post-reunification, and the 
renovation cohorts respectively.   
 
Each regional sample was divided equally into 12 categories among male and female 
respondents, urban and rural settings, and the three marriage cohorts.  Since either a married 
woman or man was interviewed in each surveyed household, husbands and wives interviewed 
were not married to each other.  The sample was designed to be representative and self-
weighting within these 12 categories5.  In this study, we restrict the analyses to couples whose 
                                                                                                                                                             
percent were born in one of the provinces covered by the survey (i.e., Ho Chi Minh City and six surrounding 
provinces) and 87 percent were born in the former South Vietnam. Results for their spouses are virtually identical. 
Note that these percentages would all be even higher if reference were to the place of residence at the time of 
marriage since they refer to net lifetime migration and not to migration since the time of marriage.   
 
4 Based on the targeted sample size, the sample design of each survey involved drawing respondents from nine 
urban districts/towns and nine rural districts. Within each district, three communes were selected and within each 
commune, two villages were selected. Within each village/urban residential grouping, households were randomly 
selected using a preset interval determined by the total number of dwelling units within the sample site (based on the 
anticipated number of households that would need to be visited to obtain the desired number of interviews of each 
category). Each household was asked a short set of screening questions to determine if it contained an eligible 
respondent. Screening continued until the number of interviews of each type needed from the sample site was 
completed. Response rates were 79.6 percent for the northern survey and 72.8 percent for the southern survey. Most 
non-response was due to the eligible respondent not being at home at the time of contact or re-contact. Less than a 
third of non-response in both surveys was due to refusal to be interviewed.   
 
5 Due to the sampling design, the distribution of respondents differs from the general population of Vietnam. For 
example, while almost three quarters of the national population is rural, the study sample is half rural. In addition, 
very young married individuals were disproportionately excluded because the most recent marriage cohort omitted 
persons whose marital duration was below 3-4 years at the time of survey. To minimize the inclusion of couples 
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current marital relationships are their first marriage and who had at least one parent on both their 
and their spouse’s side alive at the time of marriage. One hundred respondents reported that 
either one or both spouses were previously married, while 240 respondents reported that either 
one or both sides of parent(s) deceased by the time of marriage. Our preliminary analysis 
suggests that marriage payments were significantly less common among those who had 
previously married and those whose parents were not alive (see Appendix Tables A1 and A2).  
The restriction yields a sample size of 2,283 observations, of which 52 percent are from the 
North and 48 percent the South.  Approximately 32 percent of the restricted sample are 
marriages contracted between 1963 and 1971, 33 percent between 1977 and 1985, and 35 percent 
between 1992 and 2000.   
 
Measurement of marriage payments: The surveys asked each respondent if there were 
any brideprice or dowry transfers at the time of marriage. The Vietnamese culture prominently 
distinguishes these two types of marital transfers by prescribing distinct terms for them: “thach 
cuoi” for brideprice and “hoi mon” for dowry6. When respondents reported that either or both 
types of marriage payments occurred, they would be probed if the families gave the following 
items as brideprice or dowry: money, gold, house, land, household goods, and others. The 
information allows us to measure prevalence and direction of the payments.  While the surveys 
did not ask respondents about monetary values of the payments, we can gauge the magnitude of 
the payments based on types and number of gift items being exchanged.  We are limited, 
however, in the assessment of the property rights of the payments since the surveys lack such 
information.  It is unlikely that our measurement of marriage payments is biased by the stigma 
imposed by the socialist policies against marriage payments.  By 2003-4 when the surveys were 
conducted, Vietnam had fully embraced market capitalism and such stigma had likely subsided. 
According to a more recent study conducted in remote areas of northern Vietnam where socialist 
legacies lingered and cadres still commanded a high status in the village life, middle-aged 
villagers who got married during the socialist period comfortably discussed their and their 
children’s marriage payments (Teerawichitchainan et al., 2007).  
 
While it is not possible to rule out recall errors in the surveys, the questionnaire 
instruments were carefully designed to minimize such errors. For example, instead of probing 
monetary values of the payments, respondents were prompted whether a particular gift was 
exchanged as brideprice or dowry. Not only is such a question straightforward but it permits a 
cohort comparison without requiring an adjustment for changes in the cost of living and currency 
values.  It is important to note that gender of the respondent likely influences the reporting of 
marriage payments. Our diagnostic analysis (Appendix Table A3) suggests that female 
respondents tended to report dowry transfers more frequently than their male counterparts. It is 
plausible that some male respondents might not be aware of dowry given to the bride by her 
                                                                                                                                                             
who might be involuntarily childless, the surveys included only married women who were under age 40 at the time 
of marriage and married men whose wife was younger than 40 at the time of marriage. Other than this, there was no 
age restriction for respondents to participate in the surveys. Given several unique features and limitations of the 
samples, we do not attempt to weight the results to make them representative of Vietnam as a whole.  
 
6 Interestingly, in Vietnam’s neighboring country Thailand where bilateral kinship system is common and dowry 
payments are not considered a custom, although a bride may sometimes receive gifts from her natal family, unlike in 
Vietnamese language there is no vocabulary in Thai to describe such marital transfer (Bumroongsook, 1995). 
10 
 
family or that they may not recognize that gifts such as blankets or personal clothing brought into 
a new conjugal unit by the bride are considered dowry since the transfer of dowry is much less 
official and less ritualized than that of brideprice (Kleinen, 1999; Malarney, 2002; Personal 
communication with sociologist Tran Minh Thi, 2011). Given that by study design, essentially 
equal numbers of men and women were interviewed for each cohort in both regions, it is 
unlikely that any biases associated with reporting distort observed cohort or regional differences 
in marriage payments – the focus of our study. This would only be the case if the extent or the 
nature of the bias differed systematically by region and cohort. 
 
 To determine prevalence and direction of marriage payments, our analyses use 
dichotomous variables indicating whether any brideprice, any dowry, or both types of payments 
(i.e., bidirectional transfers) occurred at the time of marriage.  Approximately 43 percent of 
marriages in the sample reported brideprice, 39 percent dowry, and 28 percent bidirectional 
marriage payments.  To measure multifaceted aspects of marriage payments, we also include 
additional dependent variables to identify marriages without any payments, those with only 
brideprice, and those with only dowry. About 46 percent of the sample observed no exchange at 
the time of marriage, 15 percent only brideprice, and 11 percent only dowry.  To gauge the 
magnitude of marriage payments, we further incorporate a series of dichotomous variables 
indicating whether or not the marriage involved a brideprice or dowry transfer of money/gold, 
house/land, household goods, or multiple gifts.  An exchange of money/gold as brideprice and 
dowry accounted for 28 and 32 percent of the sample respectively. Meanwhile, one fifth reported 
transferring house/land as brideprice; only 5 percent did so as dowry.  Twelve percent of the 
sample observed brideprice and dowry transfers of household goods, which include a small 
proportion of miscellaneous gifts. Multiple-gift giving as brideprice and dowry transfers was not 
widely practiced involving just 13 and 9 percent of the sample respectively.   
 
 Measurement of independent variables: Key independent variables in our study are 
marriage cohort and region. Since a marriage cohort represents an aggregate of couples who had 
a common exposure to Vietnam’s historical events and socioeconomic transformations, we use 
marriage cohort to measure the compounding effects of major structural and policy changes that 
took place over the three key historical periods, including war, post-reunification, and market 
reform. Additionally, we use region as a covariate to estimate potentially different cultural 
orientations between the North and South and, because of different North-South timing of 
exposure to socialism, to gauge the roles of socialist agenda in transforming marriage payments. 
Within a bivariate framework, we describe for each marriage cohort and region how prevalent 
the practice of marriage payments was, to what extent the payments were bidirectional or one-
directional, and which direction the payments originated from. Moreover, we illustrate the extent 
to which levels of brideprice, dowry, and bidirectional marital transfers varied by marriage 
cohort and region and examine what specifically in each marital transaction was transferred as 
brideprice and dowry. Within a multivariate framework, we use binary logistic regressions to 
examine the net effects of marriage cohort and region and to address other important 
determinants of three dominant patterns of marriage payments, namely brideprice transfers, 
dowry payments, and bidirectional marital transfers.  
 
Measurement and description of control variables: Since Vietnam’s rapid structural 
and policy transformations over the last half century might have altered bride’s and groom’s 
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characteristics and manner of mate selection across successive cohorts and the changes in these 
attributes might in turn have affected practice of marriage payments, our multivariate analyses 
incorporate the following covariates as control variables, including spousal location of growing 
up, bride’s and groom’s educational attainment and marital age, and parental involvement in 
mate selection.  Our choice of control variables is influenced by the existing literature and 
governed by the availability of data. Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample by the 
control variables. Descriptive statistics are presented separately for each marriage cohort and 
region.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Cohort trends and regional differences in the control variables reflect changes in 
population characteristics as a result of societal transformations during 1963-2000. First, spousal 
place of growing up is incorporated by a variable indicating whether both spouses grew up in 
rural areas or at least one of them was raised in urban location. For every marriage cohort, there 
were significantly higher proportions of southern couples than their northern counterparts who 
grew up in urban localities. The regional difference appeared to narrow overtime. For the North, 
this could be a result of the socialist government’s rigorous attempts to swiftly industrialize and 
modernize the society first via socialist means and subsequently via market measures. Results 
demonstrate increasing proportions of northern couples in the post-reunification and renovation 
cohorts with urban upbringing. Nevertheless, the North-South gap remained significant among 
the most recent cohort.  Given that modernization perspective posits that the custom of marriage 
payments tend to decline first among urban populations followed by their rural counterparts, we 
anticipate that the odds of marriage payments –be it brideprice, dowry, or bidirectional marriage 
transfers—to be lower among marriages in which at least one spouse was raised in urban 
locations. 
 
Bride’s and groom’s education and, to a certain extent, their marital age are basic 
indicators of human capital levels and to a certain extent, their family socioeconomic status. 
Results suggest that gender gap in schooling was more salient in the South than in the North, 
especially among the earlier marriage cohorts. Northern brides and grooms were generally better 
educated than their southern counterparts, although educational attainment improved among 
recent marriage cohorts in both regions. The regional differences reflect the North’s earlier and 
longer exposure to socialist policies which attempted to eradicate illiteracy and to expand equal 
educational opportunities for girls and boys.  In addition to regional gaps in educational 
attainment, Table 1 also indicates North-South differences in marital timing.  For the war and 
post-reunification cohorts, average age at first marriage was higher among northern brides and 
grooms than their southern counterparts. This likely echoes the impact of the family law, 
implemented in 1960 in the North and after 1975 in the South, which mandated a minimum age 
at marriage to be 18 years for brides and 20 years for grooms. Interestingly, the regional 
differences in timing of marriage were negligible among grooms from the recent cohort, whereas 
average northern brides married at significantly younger age than their southern counterparts.  
Our analyses incorporate bride’s and groom’s education as dichotomous variables indicating 
whether they have high education (i.e., having 12 or more years of schooling) and include their 
marital age as continuous variables. According to human capital perspective put forth by 
economists, as society becomes more developed; the labor market more diversified, and return to 
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education increases, it will be more rational for parents to invest in their children’s education, 
which likely causes marital delays, rather than to invest in marriage payments. We hypothesize 
that high educational attainment and delay in marital timing will reduce the likelihood of 
marriage payments.  Nevertheless, high educational attainment, as a proxy for high family 
socioeconomic status, could increase the odds and magnitude of marriage payments, especially 
among the most recent cohorts, since well-off parents are likely more financially equipped to 
transfer resources to their children when they get married.  
 
Lastly, manner of mate selection is incorporated as a dichotomous variable signifying 
whether spouse was chosen by children or was arranged by parents (with or without children’s 
approval).  Table 1 indicates that while there was a continual decline in parental influence over 
time, every cohort of southern marriages was significantly more likely than their northern 
counterparts to be arranged by parents. Such observed finding can be due to generally younger 
age at marriage among southern brides and grooms (especially the first two cohorts); some 
cultural preferences unique to the South; or the fact that arranged marriage was prohibited first in 
the North and later in the South after the reunification. Since marriage payments traditionally 
went hand in hand with the practice of arranged marriage, we expect parental involvement in 
mate selection to increase the likelihood of brideprice, dowry, and bidirectional marital transfers.     
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Trends in marriage payments: Table 2 describes prevalence and direction of marriage 
payments across successive marriage cohorts in the North and South.  Several findings stand out.  
First, during war years, marriage payments were not common in the North, with less than 30 
percent of the cohort observing the custom. In sharp contrast, some forms of payment occurred 
in nearly 6 out of 10 southern marriages contracted during the corresponding period.  Following 
reunification, the North witnessed a moderate increase in marriage payments, whereas 
proportions of southern marriages that witnessed any payments declined slightly.  More striking 
was the surge in prevalence of marriage payments during the 1990s in both regions but 
particularly in the North. This resulted in the North-South convergence, with approximately 70 
percent of marriages in the two regions practicing some forms of marital exchange.    
 
[Table 2 about here] 
  
When brideprice and dowry are considered separately, it is evident that both increased 
substantially following market reform but that in both regions the practice of dowry rose more 
than brideprice. Moreover, for all three marriage cohorts, brideprice occurred more frequently in 
the South than in the North, even though by the time of market reform the regional gap had 
already narrowed considerably. In contrast, while dowry was more prevalent during war years in 
the South compared to the North, the difference reversed among the renovation cohort with 
dowry becoming more typical in the North than the South.  Contrary to past ethnographic 
studies, our analysis shows that bidirectional transfers were far from being widely practiced in 
Vietnam.  During war years as well as after reunification, one-directional payments accounted 
for a larger proportion of northern and southern marriages than did bidirectional transfers.  It was 
not until the 1990s that bidirectional payments became the dominant pattern of marital exchange 
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for both regions. Our empirical evidence further indicates that it was not always the case that 
brideprice was compulsory and that dowry was voluntary.  For example, when one-directional 
payments occurred, it could be either brideprice-only or dowry-only transfers. Although 
brideprice-only transfers were more common than dowry-only payments for all cohorts of 
southern marriages, the opposite was true for northern couples married after reunification and 
economic reform.   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 To show more nuanced trends in marriage payments, Figure 1 depicts the extent to which 
prevalence of brideprice, dowry, and bidirectional transfers changed across marriage cohorts and 
regions with each of the three cohorts subdivided into two groupings of 5-year and 4-year 
intervals.  The main regional difference evident in this figure is with respect to the prevalence of 
brideprice (Figure 1a). Among marriages contracted in the North, it started already to increase 
during the early 1980s, whereas in the South brideprice payments continued to decrease 
moderately during the corresponding period compared to prior to the socialist collectivization.  
Only after market reform is an increase apparent with the prevalence of brideprice in the South 
surpassing even the levels observed during pre-socialist years. Also noteworthy is that following 
reunification the southern levels of dowry and bidirectional transfers dropped more significantly 
than that of brideprice, as evidenced in Figures 1b and 1c, before rebounding in the late 1980s 
and 1990s.  On the contrary, the North witnessed a consistent rise in the practice of dowry and 
bidirectional payments across successive marriage cohorts, although only to a modest extent 
prior to economic reform.  Another notable trend is that the throughout the 1990s the frequency 
of all three patterns of marriage payments continued to increase and that by the late 1990s nearly 
half of all marriages in both regions involved bidirectional marital transfers.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 In lieu of addressing the magnitude of marital transfers, we examine how brideprice and 
dowry were expressed and how such expressions transformed during 1963-2000.  Results are 
presented in Table 3.  Significant differences were evident between the North and South with 
respect to material gifts that were exchanged as brideprice. Across all three cohorts of northern 
marriages, approximately two thirds of brideprice payments involved transfers of house/land. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the newlyweds, rather than the bride’s family, hold property 
rights of such transfers.  Further, while household goods were reported as a typical brideprice 
among earlier cohorts in the North, money/gold became increasingly more common among more 
recent marriages.  Unlike the North, brideprice transfers in the South appeared to heavily involve 
money/gold. Across all three cohorts, they accounted for nearly or over 80 percent of all 
brideprice payments. Even among the cohort anticipated to experience severe economic hardship 
(1977-1985), preference for transferring money/gold as brideprice seemed to remain strong. 
Transfers of property such as house/land could also be observed among southern marriages but 
to a much lesser extent than the North.  
 
Compared to brideprice, there was greater regional similarity in how dowry was 
expressed. Table 3 (bottom panel) demonstrates that dowries in the North and South alike often 
involved money/gold. In the North, it accounted for nearly two thirds of all dowry payments 
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during war years and immediately following reunification and characterized 9 out of 10 dowries 
occurring during the 1990s.  Likewise, in the South throughout the four decades examined, over 
80 percent of dowry transfers were expressed in the form of money/gold. Concurring with 
anthropological accounts, we find that dowry transfers of household goods were typical in all 
three cohorts of northern marriages, whereas the South observed transfers of house or land more 
frequently than the North.  Also important is increasing levels of multiple-gift giving as 
brideprice and dowry in both regions, although the prevalence was somewhat greater in the 
North than the South.  
 
Determinants of marriage payments: To move beyond the detailed descriptive picture 
of trends in marriage payments, we turn to multivariate analyses to explore mechanisms 
underlying the observed temporal trends and regional differences.  In particular, we use binary 
logistic regressions to address determinants of three patterns of marriage payments: 1) 
brideprice, 2) dowry, and 3) bidirectional marital transfers.  In the following analyses, each 
dependent variable is coded 1 if the particular aspect of payments (e.g., any brideprice) took 
place and 0 if not (e.g., no brideprice). When analyzing each dependent variable, we incorporate 
two models. First, the baseline model treats trends in payments (e.g., brideprice) as a function of 
marriage cohort and region. Second, the saturated model adds control variables, including 
measures of bride’s and groom’s place of growing up, educational attainment, marital age, and 
manner of mate selection.  Essentially, two key questions are addressed here. First and foremost, 
to what extent can marriage cohort and region explain observed trends in payments, after taking 
into account control variables or changes in population characteristics? Second and of lesser 
importance, to what extent are variations in payments a result of differences in individual 
background characteristics, net of cohort and regional influences?  
 
Our multivariate analyses, presented in Table 4, consist of two procedures.  In the first 
procedure, we analyze all marriages, regardless of their regions, in the same regression models. 
For convenience, we refer to this as analyses of the combined sample. Coefficients are expressed 
as the odds ratios of a specific type of marriage payments to non-payments for each category 
relative to the comparable odds of the reference category for each variable. Odds ratios above 1 
indicate that the particular category is associated with higher chances than the reference category 
that the particular marriage payment took place, whereas values below 1 indicate the opposite. 
The reference categories are as follows: the marriage contracted during wartime (1963-1971), 
residing in the North, both spouses growing up in rural areas, the bride and the groom having 
less than 12 years of schooling, and the couple making their own decision about mate selection. 
The bride’s and the groom’s marital age are incorporated in the analyses as continuous variables. 
Results from the analyses of the combined sample are presented on the top panel of Table 4.  
Following the first procedure, the second procedure features separate regression analyses for 
each regional sample in order to consider possible interaction effects between region and each of 
the control variables. While using a similar analytical approach as in the combined sample, only 
coefficients for marriage cohort are reported in Table 4 (lower panel), largely to make the 
discussion of our findings more focused and secondly, because analyses based on either 
combined or regional samples yield roughly similar results with regards to direction and size of 
additional coefficients.    
 
[Table 4 about here] 
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 Marriage cohort is the most robust predictor of marriage payments in Vietnam. Results 
indicate that marriages contracted in the 1990s cohort were several times more likely than the 
war cohort to observe marriage payments – be it brideprice, dowry, or bidirectional transfers. A 
comparison between baseline and saturated models indicate that these net cohort effects 
remained largely unchanged after additional covariates were considered.  In the analyses of the 
combined sample (top panel), not only were the coefficients for marriage cohort unaffected by 
control variables but the size of coefficients also grew modestly, implying even greater 
importance of cohort in predicting marriage payments. Findings suggest that given other 
characteristics being equal, marriages contracted after economic reform had between 3-4 times 
greater chance than those married during war years to experience brideprice, dowry, and 
bidirectional payments.  Further, when each regional sample is analyzed separately (lower 
panel), the independent positive effects of the 1990s marriage cohort remained strong. The most 
striking is that the North observed a considerably more dramatic upward trend in marriage 
payments, especially dowry and bidirectional transfers, following economic reform than did the 
South.  Saturated models, for instance, suggest that northern marriages contracted after reform 
were about 4-7 times more likely than their wartime counterparts to involve brideprice, dowry, 
and bidirectional transfers possibly because payments were suppressed relatively severely during 
war years. Compared to the North, the South observed more modest, yet strongly positive, 
effects of economic reform on marriage payments.   
  
 Unlike the impact of economic reform on marriage payments, change in payments 
following reunification appeared to be minimal.  Based on the analyses of the combined sample, 
the difference in the likelihood of marriage payments between the wartime and post-reunification 
cohorts was negligible. None of the odds ratios suggest any statistically significant difference.  
However, when the analyses are conducted separately for each region certain nuances stand out.  
On one hand, southern marriages observed roughly no change in brideprice and bidirectional 
transfers between war and post-reunification years, as the coefficient for the 1977-85 cohort 
remained statistically insignificant, with exception for dowry which showed a modest but 
significant decline following reunification.  On the other hand, our analyses suggest that there 
were moderate upward trends in all types of marriage payments among northern marriages 
contracted after reunification. The significantly increased odds of marriage payments among the 
North’s post-reunification cohort calls into question how successful the socialist regime managed 
to suppress this traditional marriage practice, especially brideprice, in a socialist stronghold such 
as northern Vietnam.  
 
Although the North and South were quite different in their cultural orientations as well as 
historical, social, and political trajectories, the effects of region on marriage payments were more 
modest than the influences of cohort which we observed earlier.  Results shown in Table 4 (top 
panel) indicate that the South was more likely than the North to observe brideprice and 
bidirectional payments and that these net influences changed only slightly after the introduction 
of control variables. We find that that there was no significant difference between the North and 
South in dowry payments and that it was only when analyzing each regional sample separately 
that some regional divergence in trends in dowry emerged. While the North observed a steadily 
upward trend in dowry across successive cohorts, the South experienced a decline in dowry after 
reunification before it rose again in the 1990s.   
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 To address the second key question of the multivariate analyses, we turn our attention to 
the extent to which observed variations in payments can be explained by net differences in 
population characteristics. Our descriptive analysis (Table 1) demonstrates that there were 
remarkable changes among recent marriage cohorts with regards to background characteristics of 
brides and grooms and their manner of mate selection to becoming more urbanized, better 
educated, married at a later age, and more independent in spousal selection. Such transformations 
were expected to lead to a decline in marriage payments according to modernization or human 
capital perspectives. Yet, as noted earlier, the introduction of these variables into multivariate 
analyses barely affected the net effects of marriage cohort and region on marriage payments.  
Moreover, when examining the effects of each control variable more closely, results are rather 
inconclusive.  For example, net of cohort and region influences, bride’s high education had 
independent negative effects on the odds of brideprice; yet, the factor was positively associated 
with the likelihood of dowry.  Meanwhile, groom’s high education positively (although rather 
weakly) increased the odds of dowry but made no difference in explaining variations in 
brideprice or bidirectional transfers.  Similarly inconsistent are the effects of groom’s and bride’s 
marital age. Manner of mate selection is perhaps the only control variable that had consistent, 
independent effects on all types of marriage payments. Results suggest that the likelihood of 
payments increased when marriages were arranged by parents. Nevertheless, the net effects of 
manner of mate selection were far less robust when compared to those of marriage cohort and 
region.       
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Our study extends prior research by conducting systematic analyses of population-based 
representative survey data from the Vietnam Study of Family Change to examine recent trends in 
marriage payments and to address mechanisms underlying the observed change in payments 
across three successive marriage cohorts, particularly the recent resurgence of brideprice and 
dowry in the country.  Not only are we able to document prevalence of payments but we can also 
describe directions and magnitude of the payments – thus, producing a comprehensive 
assessment of trends in brideprice, dowry, and bidirectional transfers in Vietnam from 1963 to 
2000.  In addition, we investigate the extent to which structural and policy transformations 
during the second half of the 20th century influenced the practice of marriage payments as well as 
estimate how these societal changes indirectly impacted payments via their effects on population 
characteristics.  Further, our research also represents one of the few existing studies that 
empirically examine the prevalence and determinants of bidirectional marital transfers.   
 
Our study is not without limitations. We are mindful about restrictions such as potential 
recall errors, gender discrepancy in reporting dowry, lack of information about who exactly 
holds property rights of marriage payments, limited choice of control variables, and reliance of 
retrospective reporting to measure trends given the cross-sectional nature of our data. We are 
also aware of certain caveats with regards to inferential explanations. For example, since our 
study relates behavior at the time of marriage to the present region of residence, our regional 
comparisons might be affected by post-marital migration into the survey from the outside even 
though we have documented that such migration was relatively modest during the span of time 
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covered by the survey. Moreover, we are limited in our discussion of pre-socialist North because 
the oldest cohort interviewed in the survey was married in 1963 when the socialist revolution had 
already taken place there.  Further, it is possible that North-South differences, especially among 
earlier cohorts, could result partially from underreporting of brideprice in the North due to 
stronger social norms against brideprice there. Since the survey was conducted two decades after 
the reform whereby marriage payments had already characterized a majority of marriages, we 
assume that stigma against brideprice had already diminished greatly by the time of the survey.  
 
 Despite certain limitations described above, several interesting findings stand out from 
our analyses. First, we demonstrate that population-based prevalence, directions, and magnitude 
of payments were considerably more nuanced than what conventional wisdom or past 
ethnographic studies had suggested and that these variations existed at least in the South even 
prior to socialist collectivization. The trends observed among southern marriages contracted 
during 1963-1971 provide some empirical evidence of how marriage payments were practiced in 
the region during pre-socialist years. Descriptive results suggest that traditionally marriage 
payments were commonly observed but they were far from being universally practiced. About 60 
percent of southern marriages observed some forms of payments with brideprice payments being 
more prevalent than dowry transfers.  Further, we find that payments in the pre-socialist South 
were not necessarily bidirectional and that one-directional payments (mainly brideprice) were 
actually slightly more common than bidirectional transfers during this period.  
 
 The socialist agenda which attempted to reform Vietnam’s traditional marriage and 
family system definitely had some impacts on the practice of marriage payments.  But it 
appeared to affect the North and the South differentially. Our multivariate results point to very 
strong independent effect of marriage cohort, which is used to estimate compounding effects of 
structural and policy change, and that of region, which is incorporated to control for differential 
timing in exposure to the socialist agenda, in explaining observed variations of trends in 
payments.  We find that the government very likely was able to suppress marriage payments in 
the North to a considerable extent but it could not completely eradicate either brideprice or 
dowry. Among the war cohort, for example, the prevalence of brideprice and dowry payments 
was considerably lower in the North than in the South; yet, some forms of payments still 
occurred in about 30 percent of all marriages. Further, the suppressing effects appeared to be 
rather short-lived, as evidenced in our descriptive and multivariate findings. The prevalence of 
dowry began to increase gradually since the early 1970s and its upward trend became even 
clearer among marriages contracted after reunification. The early return of dowry could possibly 
be explained by existing policies at the time in which the regime did not attack dowry directly as 
it did to brideprice and that dowry could potentially be perceived as enhancing the status of 
newlywed daughters, which went along well with the socialist goal to promote women’s status.  
By the early 1980s, a few years prior to the implementation of market reform, it was apparent 
that the upward trends in dowry among northern marriages were followed by moderate increases 
in brideprice and bidirectional transfers.  At this point, the family law might have been less 
strictly enforced by local cadres, corresponding to evidence indicating that in the late 1970s 
subpar productivity led to much less rigorous attempts by the state to collectivize farming which 
eventually gave way to the official market reform in 1986 (Fforde and de Vylder,1996).   
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 Compared to the North, the regime’s attempts to restrict marriage payments in the South 
appeared to be unfruitful. Descriptive and multivariate analyses concur that the only tangible 
decline observed in the region following reunification was that of dowry. There was no 
significant change in prevalence of brideprice and bidirectional transfers. Nonetheless, 
descriptive evidence (Figures 1a and 1c) seems to hint that a slight decrease in brideprice and 
bidirectional payments may have occurred during the early 1980s. If this was the case, it could 
still be argued whether such decline was really a ramification of the socialist agenda or rather a 
result of Vietnam’s severe economic stagnation. It was plausible that under collectivization, it 
became less feasible for families to afford brideprice because of very limited disposable income. 
It was interesting, though, to observe that the decline of brideprice was less salient than that of 
dowry, perhaps suggesting that southerners might consider brideprice to be more important than 
dowry and therefore were more ready to forego dowry. Consistent with the above finding, our 
analyses also reveal that brideprice became less frequently expressed as money and gold during 
the period after reunification. This plausibly echoes the economic condition at the time when the 
government tightly controlled goods and market transactions (Beresford, 1988).  
 
 Conventional wisdom posits that traditional practices, including those related to marriage 
customs, prior to Vietnam’s partition in 1954 were more prevalent in the North than in the South 
(Rambo, 1973). The socialist regime’s moderate success in suppressing marriage payments in the 
North are arguably attributable to a number of factors, including northern Vietnam’s stronger 
historical patterns of communality, longer exposure to socialism, more rigorous organization 
efforts by the Communist Party during the late 1950s, and the strengthening of local cadres 
during the Vietnam War (Goodkind, 1996; Malarney, 2002). Under collectivization, the state 
likely replaced the family to a certain extent by providing housing, jobs, and benefits to the 
population.  Evidence suggests that despite flaws in the socialist system, many northern peasants 
favored collectivization because their livelihoods were improved (Moise, 1983 cited in 
Goodkind, 1996). In such political climate, northern family strategy for survival likely required 
knowledge of the government policies, including complying to laws such as brideprice bans, and 
ideally vertical connections with local authorities as opposed to strong horizontal family 
networks (Luong, 1993; Kleinen, 1999). Nonetheless, this does not mean northerners passively 
following whatever imposed on them.  Past studies suggest that with respect to marriage 
customs, northern villager actively negotiated their way around the socialist agenda and 
reworked them to fit their traditional beliefs.  For example, the traditional custom of exchanging 
betel leaves and areca nuts remained largely intact because the gifts were argued to be 
inexpensive and the exchange did not support religious professions (Goodkind, 1996). Further, 
although villagers were asked to organize weddings at their local government’s building, many 
villagers resisted such mandate because it was deemed very important (perhaps more important 
than their loyalty to the Communist Party) for the newlyweds to conduct an ancestral worship at 
home (Malarney, 2002). 
 
 Although the reemergence of brideprice predated the market reform by at least a few 
years, both descriptive and multivariate analyses strongly concur that the impact of Vietnam’s 
market transition on marriage payments was paramount.  During the 1990s, practices of 
brideprice and dowry returned with vengeance, with a majority of northern and southern 
marriages contracted after economic reform practicing some forms of payments.  The surge was 
particularly remarkable in the North, given the effective suppression of marriage payments in 
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earlier decades. Descriptive results also suggest that the increase for brideprice and dowry 
continued throughout the 1990s suggesting the increase had likely not peaked by the time of the 
surveys.  Also noteworthy is that corresponding to the upward trends of brideprice and dowry, 
bidirectional marital transfers became the dominant form of marital exchange during this period. 
In addition to increased prevalence, results also indicate that marriage payments, particularly 
dowry, were increasingly expressed as money/gold. Transfers of property rights such as house 
and land were still commonly practiced. There was greater tendency for multiple gifts to be 
exchanged as brideprice or dowry during this period than in the past. Changes in prevalence and 
magnitude of marriage payments observed after market reform were plausibly facilitated by two 
important changes related to state policy: decreased governmental control over household 
decisions concerning family life and growing household disposable income as a result of market 
liberalization.  
 
 As illustrated in our multivariate analyses, marriage cohort appeared to be the most 
robust determinant when it came to explain why marriage payments changed in Vietnam during 
1963-2000. Against the backdrops of significant temporal changes in characteristics of brides 
and grooms and their manner of mate selection to becoming more urbanized, better educated, 
married at a later age, or more independent in mate selection, our results suggest that these 
factors mattered relatively little when compared to structural and policy changes in predicting 
observed variations in marriage payments.  Our findings lend very little support to the 
modernization perspective put forth by anthropologists and to economic perspectives which are 
largely based on notions of supply and demand in the labor market. This implies that in Vietnam 
marriage payments, at least after economic reform, may have become increasingly disconnected 
with the notion of economic functionality.  In other words, structural and policy transformations 
in the 1990s facilitated the reemergence of marriage payments via more permissive policy and 
conducive economic conditions, even though the payments rarely served economic functions 
anymore. Urban or rural upbringing did not differentiate the likelihood of practicing marriage 
payments. Highly educated grooms were as likely as those with lower education to observe 
brideprice. The net effects of bride’s education and marital age were largely inconsistent and 
could be interpreted as a result of her human capital or family background characteristics.  
 
 What then was the key function of marriage payments among recent marriage cohorts?  
As economic development does not necessarily bring pervasive cultural change and cultural 
values could be “an enduring autonomous influence on society” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000, 
p.19), we argue that the reemergence of marriage payments might reflect the persistence of 
traditional values and cultural resilience of marriage payments in the Vietnamese society.  
Anecdotal evidence, combined with our analyses of magnitude of payments, suggests that 
brideprice, dowry, and the resultant bidirectional transfers may have increasingly become a 
status symbol for bride’s and groom’s families in recent decades. Given its increasing size (i.e., 
rising prevalence of multiple-gift giving), there could potentially affect the wealth distribution 
across generations and families, even though marriage payments might have been valued for 
their symbolic meanings rather than their practical functions. What could our findings tell about 
trends in marriage payments in the near future?  As Vietnam’s economy continues to expand 
rapidly; as younger generations tend to come from a small family due to Vietnam’s successful 
population control policy; as Vietnam has observed relatively slower rise in age at marriage 
compared to other Southeast Asian nations (Jones and Gubhaju, 2009), and as there is a growing 
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importance of wealth display, including those related to brideprice and dowry, as status symbol, 
it is likely that families are more financially equipped to invest in both their children’s human 
capital (e.g., schooling) as well as in customs closely tied to social prestige such as marriage 
payments.  Thus, in years to come, brideprice, dowry, and bidirectional transfers will likely 
continue to be prevalent and culturally functional, regardless of their economic functionality.   
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North South North South North South 
(N=366) (N=353) (N=403) (N=359) (N=418) (N=384)
Spousal place of growing up
  Both rural 80 63 71 52 64 52
  One or both urban 20 37 29 48 36 48
  Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Bride's education
  Less than 12 years 76 91 68 81 58 78
  High education 24 9 32 19 42 22
  Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
  Mean years of schooling 9.0 5.6 *** 10.0 7.1 *** 10.0 7.9 ***
Groom's education
  Less than 12 years 58 75 64 69 51 70
  High education 42 25 36 31 49 30
  Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
  Mean years of schooling 10.1 7.7 *** 10.1 8.4 *** 10.3 8.7 ***
Mean bride's marital age 21.4 19.9 *** 22.1 21.4 ** 21.7 22.9 ***
Mean groom's marital age 24.7 23.6 *** 25.2 23.6 *** 25.9 25.8 n.s.
Manner of mate selection 
  Chosen by children 87 57 96 72 97 82
  Arranged by parents 13 43 4 28 3 18
  Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Vietnam Study of Family Change, 2003-4
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, Charateristics of predictor variables by marriage cohort and region. 
Covariates 1963-1971 1977-1985 1992-2000
Sig. Sig.
***
***
*** ***
Sig.
***Based on ANOVA, difference between North and South is significant at p≤0.001; **Significant at p≤0.01; 
*Significant at p≤0.05; n.s= Not significant p-value.
***
***
Year of marriage
*** ***
*** ***
*** n.s.
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North South North South North South 
(N=366) (N=353) (N=403) (N=359) (N=418) (N=384)
% Any marriage payments 29 58 *** 39 55 *** 70 71 n.s.
% Any brideprice 21 50 *** 25 49 *** 51 61 **
% Any dowry 20 36 *** 29 30 n.s. 63 52 **
% Bidirectional payments 11 28 *** 16 24 ** 44 42 n.s.
% One-directional payments 17 31 *** 23 31 ** 27 29 n.s.
  (% Brideprice only) (9) (22) *** (9) (25) *** (8) (19) ***
  (% Dowry only) (8) (9) n.s. (14) (6) *** (19) (10) ***
Source: Vietnam Study of Family Change, 2003-4
Table 2. Descriptive statistics, Cohort and regional trends in prevalence and direction of marriage payments.
***Based on ANOVA, difference between North and South is significant at p≤0.001; **Significant at p≤0.01; *Significant at 
p≤0.05; n.s= Not significant p-value.
1963-1971 1977-1985 1992-2000
Sig. Sig. Sig.
Percentage of marriages
Year of marriage
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Figure 1. Cohort and regional trends in brideprice, dowry, and bidirectional transfers. 
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***Based on ANOVA, difference between North and South is significant at p≤0.001; **Significant at p≤0.01; *Significant at p≤0.05 
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North South Sig. North South Sig. North South Sig.
Brideprice transfers
Percent of all marriages
  (Number of observations) (366) (353) (403) (359) (418) (384)
  % Any money/gold 7 43 *** 7 38 *** 27 52 ***
  % Any house/land 13 13 n.s. 16 20 n.s. 34 23 ***
  % Any household goodsa 9 7 n.s. 12 7 ** 21 12 ***
  % More than one items 6 11 * 8 12 * 21 21 n.s.
Percent of brideprice transfers
  (Number of observations) (76) (175) (100) (177) (215) (236)
  % Any money/gold 33 86 *** 26 77 *** 52 84 ***
  % Any house/land 63 27 *** 66 40 *** 66 38 ***
  % Any household goodsa 45 13 *** 50 14 *** 41 19 ***
  % More than one items 30 22 n.s. 32 25 n.s. 41 34 n.s.
Dowry transfers
Percent of all marriages
  (Number of observations) (366) (353) (403) (359) (418) (384)
  % Any money/gold 13 30 *** 18 24 * 57 46 ***
  % Any house/land 1 9 *** 1 6 *** 2 10 ***
  % Any household goodsa 10 4 ** 17 6 *** 27 8 ***
  % More than one items 4 6 n.s. 7 5 n.s. 22 10 ***
Percent of dowry transfers
  (Number of observations) (72) (128) (118) (108) (262) (199)
  % Any money/gold 64 84 *** 62 81 ** 91 88 n.s.
  % Any house/land 6 23 *** 4 21 *** 3 19 ***
  % Any household goodsa 50 11 *** 59 19 *** 42 16 ***
  % More than one items 19 16 n.s. 25 18 n.s. 35 20 ***
a Household goods include a small proportion of miscellaneous gift items. 
Source: Vietnam Study of Family Change, 2003-4.
***Based on ANOVA, difference between North and South is significant at p≤0.001; **Significant at p≤0.01; *Significant at 
p≤0.05; n.s= Not significant p-value.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics, Cohort and regional patterns of material gifts exchanged during brideprice and dowry 
transfers.
1963-1971 1977-1985Type of material gifts 1992-2000
Year of marriage
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Table 4. Binary logistic regression analysis, The determinants of marriage payments in Vietnam, 1963-2000.
Odds 
ratios
Std. 
Error
Odds 
ratios
Std. 
Error
Odds 
ratios
Std. 
Error
Odds 
ratios
Std. 
Error
Odds 
ratios
Std. 
Error
Odds 
ratios
Std. 
Error
COMBINED SAMPLE 
Cohort 1977-85 1.09 0.11 1.27 0.12 1.10 0.12 1.12 0.12 1.01 0.13 1.04 0.14
Cohort 1992-00 2.53 *** 0.11 3.25 *** 0.12 3.51 *** 0.11 3.96 *** 0.12 3.17 *** 0.12 3.48 *** 0.13
South 2.46 *** 0.09 2.02 *** 0.11 1.08 0.09 1.19 0.11 1.48 *** 0.10 1.51 *** 0.12
Growing up in urban areas 0.86 0.10 1.00 0.10 1.01 0.11
Bride having high education 0.71 ** 0.12 1.35 ** 0.12 1.06 0.13
Groom having high education 1.12 0.12 1.23 † 0.12 1.21 0.12
Bride's marital age 0.98 0.02 0.96 * 0.02 0.98 0.02
Groom's marital age 0.96 ** 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.02
Arranged by parents 1.47 ** 0.13 1.42 ** 0.13 1.26 † 0.14
NORTH SAMPLE
Cohort 1977-85 1.26 0.17 1.35 † 0.18 1.69 ** 0.17 1.65 ** 0.18 1.43 † 0.21 1.46 † 0.22
Cohort 1992-00 4.04 *** 0.16 4.22 *** 0.17 6.86 *** 0.17 6.78 *** 0.17 6.01 *** 0.19 5.81 *** 0.20
SOUTH SAMPLE
Cohort 1977-85 0.99 0.15 1.14 0.16 0.76 † 0.16 0.73 † 0.17 0.82 0.17 0.79 0.18
Cohort 1992-00 1.62 *** 0.15 2.15 *** 0.17 1.89 *** 0.15 2.03 *** 0.16 1.90 *** 0.16 1.94 *** 0.17
Significance level: ***p≤0.001; **p≤0.01; *p≤0.05; †p≤0.1
Source: Vietnam Study of Family Change, 2003-4
Baseline Saturated
Covariates
Brideprice Dowry Bidirectional marital transfers
Baseline Saturated Baseline Saturated
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Current marriage is... Number 
% Any 
brideprice 
paid
% Any 
dowry paid
% No 
marriage 
payments
The first marriage for both bride and groom 2492 41.5 37.3 47.5
The first marriage for bride only 57 31.6 33.3 49.1
The first marriage for groom only 17 11.8 17.6 76.5
Not the first marriage for neither bride nor 
groom
26 19.2 0.0 80.8
Difference by status of current marriage ** *** ***
Source: Vietnam Study of Family Change, 2003-4 
Appendix Table A1. Prevalence of brideprice and dowry by the order of current marriage among  
respondents and their spouses. 
***Based on ANOVA, difference by the status of current marriage is significant at p≤0.001; 
**Significant at p≤0.01; *Significant at p≤0.05; n.s= Not significant p-value.
 
 
 
Presence of parents at the time of marriage Number 
% Any 
brideprice 
paid
% Any 
dowry 
paid
% No 
marriage 
payments
At least one parent on both sides alive 2352 42.6 38.4 46.3
Only parent(s) on husband's side alive 72 41.7 13.9 56.9
Only parent(s) on wife's side alive 144 18.8 25.7 65.3
No parents on either side alive 24 4.2 4.2 91.7
Difference by presence of parents *** *** ***
Source: Vietnam Study of Family Change, 2003-4 
Appendix Table A2. Prevalence of brideprice and dowry by the presence of parents at the 
time of marriage.
***Based on ANOVA, difference by presence of parents is significant at p≤0.001; 
**Significant at p≤0.01; *Significant at p≤0.05; n.s= Not significant p-value.
 
 
 
Gender of the respondent
% Any 
brideprice paid
% Any dowry 
paid
% No 
marriage 
payments
Male 41.5 32.6 49.6
Female 44.3 45.1 58.3
Male-female difference n.s. *** ***
Source: Vietnam Study of Family Change, 2003-4. 
***Based on ANOVA, difference between male and female is significant at 
p≤0.001; **Significant at p≤0.01; *Significant at p≤0.05; n.s= Not 
significant p-value.
Appendix Table A3. Prevalence of marriage payments by gender of the 
respondent. 
 
 
 
 
